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ABSTRACT 
 
We examine the effect of shareholder litigation rights on managers’ acquisition decisions. Our 
experimental design exploits a U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling on July 2, 1999 that 
resulted in a reduction in shareholder class actions. We find that, since the ruling, firms in Ninth 
Circuit states acquire larger targets. Furthermore, acquirers’ returns are lower in these states, 
especially for those with weaker corporate governance. Further analysis shows that value 
destruction is the result of managers’ freedom to conduct empire-building acquisitions using 
overvalued equity. Overall, our findings indicate the importance of shareholder litigation as an 
external governance mechanism. 
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1. Introduction 
The finance literature recognizes that agency problems can lead corporate managers to 
make acquisitions that do not maximize shareholder value. Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis argues that managers have an incentive to grow their firms excessively in order to 
increase the resources they control. Masulis et al. (2007) show that managers of firms with 
poor corporate governance are the most likely to engage in empire-building acquisitions that 
destroy shareholder value. Because acquisitions are a primary form of corporate investment, it 
is important to minimize managers’ incentives to pursue self-serving acquisitions. In this study, 
we address this issue by examining how the threat of shareholder class actions affects 
managers’ acquisition decisions. 
In the U.S., a securities class action litigation provides a mechanism through which 
shareholders can sue for managerial misconduct.2 Such lawsuits are designed to provide 
recourse in the event that other governance mechanisms are not effective, making them very 
useful for firms with poor corporate governance.3 In the agent-shareholder framework, the 
existing literature presents empirical evidence that shareholders have used class action lawsuits 
as a tool to express their dissatisfaction with or discipline inefficient management. For instance, 
there is much empirical evidence that litigation negatively affects firm value (e.g., Bhagat and 
Romano, 2002; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007). When sued, firms experience significant executive 
                                                          
2 For example, a class action was filed against BT Office Products International, Inc., in 1996, stating that the firm’s 
10Q, management discussion and analysis, and certain press releases were false and misleading with respect to 
the firm’s acquisition strategy, which consequently resulted in material losses for shareholders. Ultimately, BT 
Office Products agreed to pay USD 1.48 million to settle the case.  
 
3 Class action litigation is particularly important in the U.S. because ownership is widely dispersed and, hence, 
often does not provide enough incentive for shareholders to monitor a firm’s management (Cheng et al., 2010). 
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officer and director turnover (Humphery-Jenner, 2012; Aharony et al., 2015). Furthermore, 
such firms are less likely to finance their investments externally (Arena and Julio, 2015), reduce 
overinvestment (McTier and Wald, 2011), or improve the quality of their corporate governance 
(Ferris et al., 2007; Cheng et al., 2010). In summary, class litigation is an effective monitoring 
mechanism exercised by shareholders. 
Our study extends this line of research, investigating whether a reduction in class or 
group litigation leads managers to make value-decreasing investment decisions and, if so, in 
what way. Specifically, we exploit the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals July 2, 1999 ruling, In 
re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation, as a quasi-natural experiment to determine 
whether a regulation change can influence how effectively shareholders monitor managerial 
decisions. We choose this Ninth Circuit Court ruling for the following reason. Despite the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) of 1995, which the U.S. Congress enacted to 
make it more difficult for shareholders to file frivolous lawsuits, the incidence of securities class 
actions subsequently increased (Choi et al., 2009). In response to a call for tighter regulations, 
the U.S. Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued a ruling in 1999 mandating stricter applications of 
the PSLRA standards. Under common law, laws are created by courts using the doctrine of 
precedent, requiring judges to make decisions by considering past cases that have set a 
precedent for future cases. The ruling ultimately discourages shareholder plaintiffs from 
proceeding with legal action unless they have clear evidence of intentional managerial 
misbehavior. Crane and Koch (2018) find that, after this ruling, the number of class actions 
dropped by 43% in Ninth Circuit states (Alaska, Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, 
Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). In comparison, other circuits experienced a 14% increase in 
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class action lawsuits in the same period. Thus, we consider the Ninth Circuit Court ruling as an 
exogenous shock to shareholder litigation rights.  
To explore whether class action litigation plays an effective monitoring role in corporate 
governance, we consider mergers and acquisitions (M&As) under the Ninth Circuit Court ruling 
as our empirical setting. M&As are substantial corporate investments that have an economic 
impact on firm value; as a result, the views of shareholders and managers on M&As can differ 
significantly (Chen et al., 2007). In a related study, Jensen (1986) posits that M&As are a 
primary method used by managers to reduce their personal undiversified risk or to increase the 
scope of their authority. Researchers have documented cases in which a target firm’s 
shareholders have sued the firm’s board of directors or managers owing to a breach of duty, 
such as concealing material information about the deal or forcing the shareholders to accept 
unfavorable terms or a low bid price (Jarrell, 1985). Krishnan et al. (2012) show that M&As 
subject to target firm shareholder lawsuits are less likely to be completed, and have 
significantly higher takeover premiums if they are completed. However, few studies have 
examined how the outcomes of M&As are affected by a change in the regulatory landscape 
that directly reduces the risk of shareholder litigation.  
We first compare the performance of acquisitions by U.S. firms headquartered in Ninth 
Circuit states with that by firms headquartered in other states around the time of the Ninth 
Circuit Court ruling. This strategy effectively isolates the effect of class action risk on acquisition 
performance from that of unobservable covariates. Using corporate acquisitions announced 
between 1996 and 2003, we examine the performance of these transactions for the four-year 
periods before and after the ruling. We find that, after the ruling, the five-day cumulative 
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abnormal returns (CARs) around the acquisition announcement dates are, on average, 1.32 
percentage points lower for acquiring firms headquartered in Ninth Circuit states than they are 
for firms in other states. This finding suggests that the reduced threat of class action after the 
ruling has increased the probability that managers will undertake value-destroying, self-serving 
acquisitions. 
Next, we investigate the mechanisms through which managers destroy shareholder value. 
First, consistent with managers’ empire-building motives, we find that managers in Ninth Circuit 
states began acquiring larger firms when it became more difficult for shareholders to form class 
action lawsuits. Second, acquisitions in the Ninth Circuit states began including greater 
proportions of equity payments, implying that these managers were likely to be conducting 
empire-building acquisitions using overvalued equity. Furthermore, we find that the threat of 
class action litigation has a greater effect on acquirer returns in firms with weaker corporate 
governance, that is, firms with high E-index scores, few blockholders, low CEO ownership, or 
CEO duality. This result makes sense because the threat of litigation was likely playing an 
important role in the governance of these firms before the ruling, thereby limiting managers’ 
empire building at the expense of shareholder wealth. 
Finally, we conduct a series of additional analyses. The findings are as follows. First, the 
reduced threat of class actions by shareholders has induced managers of firms in Ninth Circuit 
states to be overly optimistic about future earnings announcements surrounding M&As. Second, 
after the ruling, managers in Ninth Circuit states inflated earnings in the quarter prior to making 
an acquisition. Moreover, this behavior occurred only when acquisitions were funded by stock. 
This result suggests that, since the ruling, managers have been incentivized to pursue empire-
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building acquisitions using overvalued equity, fueling a spate of value-destroying, self-serving 
acquisitions. As a final test, we investigate whether the Ninth Circuit ruling affects the likelihood 
of CEO replacement, especially when CEOs are engaged in value-decreasing acquisitions. We 
find a lower probability of CEO replacement (and forced CEO replacement) after the ruling for 
firms in Ninth Circuit states than for firms in other states. Moreover, the likelihood of CEO 
replacement is not significantly affected by value-decreasing acquisitions. This implies that a 
lower threat of shareholder litigation increases managerial entrenchment, thus contributing to 
managers’ value-destroying, empire-building acquisitions.  
Our study contributes to three strands of literature. First, we contribute to the existing 
literature on the role of corporate governance in M&As, which is well documented. For instance, 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) examine tender offers and find that independent boards are 
associated with higher bidder returns. Datta et al. (2001) find that managers with equity-based 
compensation have a greater incentive to make good acquisitions. Masulis et al. (2007) show 
that acquiring firms with higher anti-takeover provisions have lower announcement returns. 
Although existing studies have examined the role of conventional governance mechanisms (e.g., 
board characteristics, compensation structures, or anti-takeover provisions) in M&As, few 
examine how the threat of shareholder litigation as an external governance tool affects a firm’s 
acquisition decisions. We address this gap by exploiting a regulatory reform that affected the 
threat of class action shareholder litigation to examine the role that this threat plays in 
acquisition decisions.  
Second, our study contributes to the literature on stock price manipulations in M&As. 
Erickson and Wang (1999) and Louis (2004) show that acquiring firms often overstate their 
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earnings prior to stock swap announcements in order to boost their stock prices. However, 
Gong et al. (2008) find that acquirers who do so are more likely to attract subsequent lawsuits. 
Anagnostopoulou and Tsekrekos (2015) find that firms seeking to be acquired also engage in 
earnings management. Cumming et al. (2019) show that stock price manipulation prior to 
M&As increases the probability that an M&A deal will be withdrawn and reduces the premium 
paid. Our study adds to this literature by showing that a reduced threat of class action litigation 
by shareholders makes it more likely that managers of acquiring firms will engage in earnings 
manipulation to boost their firms’ stock prices before M&As.  
Third, our study contributes to the literature on the effect of shareholder litigation rights 
on corporate policies. On the positive side, Ferris et al. (2007) and Appel (2019) find that the 
threat of shareholder litigation plays an important role in corporate governance by limiting 
managers’ ability to introduce governance provisions and compensation structures that are 
prone to agency problems. Houston et al. (2019) find that the threat of shareholder litigation 
encourages voluntary disclosure practices by firms. On the negative side, Lin et al. (2019) show 
that the threat of shareholder litigation discourages corporate innovation, owing to the 
potential for project failure. In this case, the resulting stock price reduction would likely present 
shareholders with an opportunity to file a lawsuit related to a breach of fiduciary duty. Similarly, 
Chu and Zhao (2019) show that the threat of shareholder litigation encourages managers to 
select acquisitions with minimal risk, thus avoiding lawsuits rather than selecting acquisitions 
that maximize shareholder wealth. This result is consistent with Jensen’s (1993) suggestion that 
because most lawsuits are frivolous, managers have a legal incentive to avoid such lawsuits by 
minimizing downside risk rather than maximizing shareholder value. This study contributes to 
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this literature by examining how the threat of shareholder litigation acts as a governance tool, 
as well as its effect on acquisition decisions. 
Our study is closest in spirit to that of Chu and Zhao (2019), but differs markedly in terms 
of the hypotheses developed and tested. Chu and Zhao (2019) assume that the threat of 
shareholder litigation forces managers to select acquisitions with minimal risk in order to avoid 
lawsuits, which limits them from selecting acquisitions that maximize shareholder wealth. In 
contrast, we assume that this threat of litigation plays an important role in external 
governance, thus encouraging managers to select acquisitions that do maximize shareholder 
wealth. Naturally, our findings also differ significantly from theirs. However, the biggest 
distinction lies in the likely difference in the quality of the corporate governance standards 
within firms targeted by derivative lawsuits and class actions.4 In a derivative suit, the financial 
remedy goes to the firm. Therefore, a shareholder is only likely to file a derivative lawsuit if 
s/he believes the firm can use the financial remedy to improve shareholder wealth. This 
requires that shareholders have faith in the firm, and that the firm can properly address 
managerial misconduct and improve its corporate governance to prevent future misconduct. 
On the other hand, in the case of class actions, the financial remedy goes only to the class of 
                                                          
4 Furthermore, the legal environment with regard to “frivolous” lawsuits associated with derivative and 
class action lawsuits prior to the changes in legislation was quite different. Prior to the staggered adoption of UD 
laws, shareholders were able to bypass company directors’ agreements and initiate a derivative suit on behalf of 
the corporation. Ni and Yin (2018) suggest that, “the availability of the ‘futility exception’ caused abusive use of 
derivative lawsuits, wasting time and money for courts and corporations” (p. 172). This suggests that it was very 
easy for shareholders to file “frivolous” lawsuits. On the other hand, after the 1995 PSLRA, the number of 
“frivolous” class action lawsuits likely decreased, even though the overall number of class actions increased. Hence, 
more “good” than “frivolous” class action lawsuits were filed before the 1999 Ninth Circuit ruling. Therefore, it is 
important to show that it was only after it became more difficult for shareholders to litigate, after the ruling, that 
the number of “good” class action lawsuits dropped. 
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plaintiff shareholders. This could indicate that the shareholders have little faith that the firm 
will use the financial remedy to improve its corporate governance and performance. Therefore, 
these shareholders are better off seeking a financial remedy for themselves. Overall, the 
differences between the financial remedy payouts suggest that firms targeted by class actions 
are likely to be governed less well than are firms targeted by derivative lawsuits.5  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we review the literature to 
provide the legal background of M&A litigation, develop our hypotheses, and present our 
research design. Section 3 describes the data and explains the variable construction. Section 4 
examines how the threat of shareholder class action litigation affects acquisition decisions, and 
Section 5 identifies the channels through which value destruction takes place. Section 6 
describes a set of robustness tests and additional analyses. Lastly, section 7 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Literature review, hypotheses, and research design 
2.1. Institutional background 
 Under U.S. laws, corporate officers and directors have fiduciary duties to undertake 
actions that are in the best interests of shareholders, and shareholders can take legal action if 
they identify a breach of such duties. Shareholder litigation occurs mainly as derivative lawsuits 
or as securities class actions. 
                                                          
5 Indeed, consistent with the finding of Krishnan et al. (2012) that 87.6% of M&A lawsuits are class action suits, 
while only 3.4% are derivative suits, Chu and Zhao (2019) report that only 22.17% (i.e., 51 out of 230) of the M&A 
litigation cases filed between 2000 and 2012 were derivative lawsuits. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313
 10 
 
 In a derivative lawsuit, shareholders pursue the claims on behalf of the corporation (i.e., 
the corporation is the plaintiff); hence, any financial recovery goes to the corporation. However, 
various studies find that derivative suits rarely close with monetary settlements (e.g., Romano, 
1991; Erickson, 2010). Therefore, shareholders usually benefit only indirectly from improved 
corporate governance and better corporate managerial actions. In commencing a derivative 
lawsuit, shareholders are required to first demand that the board of directors address the 
allegations, which the board can either accept or refuse. Directors almost always decide against 
proceeding with litigation because they themselves are often the persons named in the lawsuit 
(Swanson, 1992). To prevent the board from blocking legitimate lawsuits, courts introduced the 
“futility exception” to allow litigant shareholders to bypass the board (Kinney, 1994). However, 
this exception resulted in abuses of the system. In response, starting in 1989, states began 
adopting universal demand (UD) laws, which require that shareholders obtain board approval 
prior to initiating a derivative lawsuit. Overall, UD laws made it more difficult for shareholders 
to file such lawsuits. 
 In contrast to a derivative lawsuit, a securities class action lawsuit addresses direct harm 
to shareholders. The plaintiff is the class of shareholders who initiate the lawsuit against 
management. Class actions provide a mechanism for shareholders who purchased or sold 
securities at a price that was affected by managerial misconduct to recover from financial loss. 
Financial recovery from class actions is paid directly, and only to the plaintiff class of 
shareholders. Empirical evidence shows that many derivative lawsuits are accompanied by class 
actions. For example, in a comparative study of shareholder litigation, Erickson (2011) reports 
that about 75% of the derivative lawsuits in the sample were accompanied by class actions. 
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2.2. Effect of shareholder litigation on corporate value and policy 
Earlier studies related to shareholder litigation document the ex post consequences of 
class action lawsuits on firms. For example, Ferris et al. (2007) and Cheng et al. (2010) show 
that firms’ corporate governance quality improves after a lawsuit is filed. In addition, McTier 
and Wald (2011) find that sued firms subsequently reduce overinvestment, and Humphery-
Jenner (2012) shows that a CEO is more likely to be replaced after a lawsuit. A recent series of 
studies examine the ex ante role of the threat of shareholder litigation. On the positive side, 
Houston et al. (2019) find that this threat encourages voluntary corporate disclosure practices, 
and Appel (2019) finds that this threat limits managers from introducing governance provisions 
that are prone to agency problems. On the negative side, Lin et al. (2019) show that 
shareholder litigation threat discourages managers from engaging in innovation, and Chu and 
Zhao (2019) find that the threat of derivative litigation encourages managers to select 
acquisitions with minimal risk, thus avoiding lawsuits rather than selecting acquisitions that 
maximize shareholder wealth. However, whether the risk of class action litigation specifically 
plays an ex ante disciplinary role in reducing management agency costs in M&As remains an 
open question.  
2.3. Shareholder litigation in M&As 
The M&A literature shows that managers often conduct empire-building acquisitions at 
the expense of shareholder value (Jensen, 1986; Masulis et al., 2007; Harford et al., 2012), and 
that one way in which shareholders can respond to such wrongdoing is by filing a lawsuit. In the 
U.S., lawsuits related to M&As can be filed as class actions, derivative lawsuits, or other (less 
common) forms. Class actions and derivative lawsuits are both forms of shareholder-
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representative litigation. The plaintiff's law firm pursues the matter at the request of a specific 
named shareholder, and on behalf of all shareholders adversely affected by the firm's actions. 
Empirical evidence shows that most M&A lawsuits are filed as class actions. For example, 
Krishnan et al. (2012) find, using a sample of M&A lawsuits, that 87.6% are class action suits, 
whereas only 3.4% are derivative suits.6 Similarly, Crutchley et al. (2015) report that M&As and 
earnings management are the most commonly cited reasons for federal class action suits.  
M&A lawsuits are usually filed as class actions because, often, only a minority “class” of 
shareholders is directly affected by managerial wrongdoing during an acquisition. Furthermore, 
as a result of the personal loss, shareholders are more likely to seek financial remedy for 
themselves, rather than for the corporation. For example, Hewlett-Packard (HP) completed its 
acquisition of British software company Autonomy for USD 10.2 billion on August 18, 2011. 
About 15 months later, on November 20, 2012, HP disclosed that it had a USD 8.8 billion charge 
related to the acquisition of Autonomy, with over USD 5 billion due to accounting irregularities 
at Autonomy. The accounting irregularities were known to HP officers, but were concealed 
from the investing public. As a result, a class action was filed “on behalf of all persons who 
purchased common stock of Hewlett-Packard Company between August 19, 2011, and 
November 20, 2012, inclusive.”7 
                                                          
6 Shareholders prefer to bring class actions to challenge M&A transactions because derivative lawsuits involve 
several procedural hurdles. Most importantly, financial recoveries from a derivative lawsuit go to the corporate 
treasury rather than to the shareholders. The limited use of derivative lawsuits makes the exogenous variation in 
shareholder litigation rights generated by UD laws less useful in our research setting, because UD laws only make it 
difficult to initiate derivative suits. 
7 http://securities.stanford.edu/filings-documents/1049/HPQ00_03/20121126_f01c_12CV05980.pdf 
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Based on the above discussion, we examine how shareholders’ litigation rights affect 
managers’ acquisition decisions. Our experimental design exploits a ruling of the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals on July 2, 1999 that resulted in a reduced threat of class action litigation. 
Under U.S. federal rules for civil procedures, shareholders have the right to sue a firm through a 
securities class action for alleged violations of federal or state securities laws. Although 
undertaking legal actions against those responsible for misdeeds is a civil right, it is also true 
that frivolous lawsuits incur unnecessary social costs. As a result, the U.S. Congress enacted the 
PSLRA in 1995 to prevent plaintiffs from filing weak or frivolous lawsuits. The reform made it 
more difficult for shareholders to initiate a securities class action lawsuit. Under the PSLRA, to 
legally form a class, plaintiffs must identify particular facts giving rise to a “strong inference” 
that the defendants acted “with the required state of mind” for fraud (Levine and Pritchard, 
1998; Johnson et al., 2001). Although the PSLRA has contributed to a less litigious environment 
for all firms, the pleading standards of the law, as a practical matter, were interpreted 
differently by various U.S. circuit courts. Here, the interpretation by the Ninth Circuit Court in 
the Silicon Graphics case, In Re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities Litigation on July 2, 1999 is the 
most stringent. The Ninth Circuit ruling requires that, prior to forming a class, plaintiffs must 
establish that the defendant acted with “deliberate recklessness” when making the 
misrepresentation that gave rise to the claim. In other circuits, proving “mere recklessness” is 
sufficient. This remarkable decision was largely unanticipated (Johnson et al., 1999), and has 
since been applied to all securities class actions filed with the Ninth Circuit Court. Crane and 
Koch (2018) show that, after the ruling, the number of class actions in the Ninth Circuit dropped 
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by 43%, whereas it increased by 14% in the other circuits. Thus, we consider the Ninth Circuit 
ruling an exogenous shock that reduced the threat of shareholder litigation in M&As.  
2.4. Hypothesis development 
It is well recognized in the finance literature that, in the absence of corporate 
governance, managers do not always make acquisitions that maximize shareholder value. For 
example, Jensen (1986) suggests that managers have an incentive to expand their firms beyond 
the optimal size to increase the resources under their control, and Masulis et al. (2007) show 
that managers in poorly governed firms are most likely to be responsible for empire-building 
acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. A securities class action litigation provides a 
mechanism by which shareholders can sue management in the event of managerial misconduct, 
such as self-serving acquisitions. Recent studies document that the threat of such litigation 
plays an important role in governance, limiting managers from introducing governance 
provisions that are prone to agency problems, and encouraging voluntary disclosure (Appel, 
2019; Houston et al., 2019). Given these prior findings, we expect the threat of shareholder 
litigation to be a useful governance tool that limits managers from pursuing self-serving 
acquisitions at the expense of shareholder wealth. Thus, we hypothesize that, since the Ninth 
Circuit ruling, which reduced the threat of shareholder litigation, managers are more likely to 
conduct self-serving acquisitions, leading to weaker acquirer returns.  
H1: All else being equal, after the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruling, acquiring firms 
headquartered in Ninth Circuit states experienced lower CARs around M&A announcements 
compared to firms headquartered in other states. 
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We next examine the ways in which managers conduct self-serving acquisitions. Jensen 
(1986) suggests that managers have an incentive to increase the resources under their control 
by expanding their firms, and studies have shown that they often do so with the help of 
overvalued equity. For example, Louis (2004) shows that acquiring firms often overstate their 
earnings in the quarter before stock-based acquisitions to try to use overvalued equity as a 
form of payment. Moeller et al. (2005) find that large-loss bidders have significantly higher 
market-to-book ratios, and finance their deals with significantly higher equity. These findings 
are consistent with Jensen’s (2005) suggestion that the significant value destruction for 
acquirers can be explained by the agency costs of overvalued equity. Thus, we hypothesize that 
managers in Ninth Circuit states are likely to acquire larger targets and use more stock financing 
in M&As after the Ninth Circuit ruling. 
H2a: All else being equal, after the ruling, firms headquartered in states under the jurisdiction 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are more likely to acquire large targets compared to firms 
headquartered in other states. 
 
H2b: All else being equal, after the ruling, firms headquartered in states under the jurisdiction 
of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals are more likely to use stock as the payment method 
compared to firms headquartered in other states. 
 
 Finally, we investigate the type of firm that is most likely to be affected by the Ninth 
Circuit ruling. Shareholder litigation is unlikely to be needed as an external governance 
mechanism in firms with good internal corporate governance. In such firms, through constant 
monitoring, the board of directors and institutional blockholders can identify and prevent 
managers from conducting self-serving acquisitions. In contrast, we expect the threat of 
shareholder litigation to play a very important governance role in firms with poor corporate 
governance. In such firms, managers can more easily conduct self-serving acquisitions, and the 
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threat of shareholder litigation is one of the only ways to prevent them from doing so. Thus, we 
hypothesize that the threat of shareholder litigation has a greater effect on the acquisition 
performance of firms with poor corporate governance.  
H3: All else being equal, the effect of lower ex ante class action litigation risk on M&A 
performance is stronger in firms with weaker corporate governance practices. 
 
2.5. Research design 
To examine how the reduced threat of shareholder litigation affects acquisition 
performance (H1), we estimate the following difference-in-differences (DID) model: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(−2, +2)𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 × 𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑖 + 𝛾𝑍𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 + 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗 +
𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑘 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡,                                                           (1) 
where t denotes the year, i denotes the firm, j denotes the industry, and k denotes the 
incorporation state. The dependent variable, 𝐶𝐴𝑅 (−2, +2)𝑖,𝑡+1, is the five-day CAR centered 
on the acquisition announcement date. Following Masulis et al. (2007), we calculate abnormal 
stock returns by estimating the market model for each acquirer over a 200-day period, ending 
11 days before the announcement date (–210, –11), using the Center for Research in Security 
Prices (CRSP) value-weighted return as the benchmark market index. The indicator variable 
Treat differentiates and controls for differences between the treatment and control groups; 
this variable takes the value one when the firm is located in a Ninth Circuit state, and zero 
otherwise. Then, Post is a time dummy, taking the value one for fiscal years after 1999, and 
zero for years 1996 to 1999. We do not include observations from years prior to 1996 because 
the PSLRA in 1995 significantly affected the litigation environment governing securities class 
actions. The DID coefficient of interest used to identify the difference in the treatment effect 
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resulting from the Ninth Circuit ruling is denoted as 𝛽. We also include a set of control 
measures, 𝑍𝑖,𝑡, identified in prior studies as firm and deal characteristics that are likely to affect 
a firm’s acquisition decisions. In addition, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡 and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑗  capture time and industry fixed 
effects, respectively. Following recent literature on the effects of state laws, we include firm 
incorporation state fixed effects, 𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑘, and cluster the standard errors at the headquarters 
state level in all regressions to account for differences in incorporation and state-level laws and 
regulations related to a firm’s headquarters (Gormley and Matsa, 2017; Houston et al., 2019).  
We also construct a control group of firms (located outside of the Ninth Circuit) that are 
matched to the treatment group (located in the Ninth Circuit) to ensure that the difference in 
acquisition performance between the treatment and control firms is not caused by cross-
sectional heterogeneity. We use the propensity score matching (PSM) method to identify a 
control firm for each treatment firm. Specifically, we first estimate a probit model using 
acquisition observations to predict the likelihood that a firm is headquartered in the Ninth 
Circuit states (Treatment). The dependent variable takes the value one if the firm is 
headquartered in one of the Ninth Circuit states, and the independent variables include all 
control variables used in this study (these variables are described in detail in section 3.2). We 
obtain the predicted propensity score from this probit model. We then match, without 
replacement, each treatment firm with a control firm, based on the closest propensity score. To 
obtain closer matches, we use the caliper matching method and match within a caliper of 0.5% 
as the maximum distance between the two groups. We then use the propensity-score matched 
sample to re-run our baseline test.  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313
 18 
 
Next, to test whether the reduced threat of shareholder litigation leads managers to 
acquire larger targets (H2a) or to use stock as the method of payment (H2b), we use the same 
set of control variables as in equation (1). In testing H2a, we replace the dependent variable 
with the relative deal size. In testing H2b, we use a probit regression and replace the dependent 
variable with a stock financing indicator, which takes the value one if 80% or more of the 
acquisition is funded by stock, and zero otherwise. 
There is a concern when testing the choices of deal size and payment method separately 
that they may not be determined separately. If so, our findings might be spurious owing to the 
correlation in the error terms of the latter two regressions. To address this concern, we employ 
a two-stage probit least squares model (PSLM), because one of the endogenous variables (i.e., 
relative deal size; referred to here as RelSize) is continuous, and the other (i.e., Stock80%) is 
binomial. The PSLM essentially runs two two-stage model regressions to account for the 
simultaneity. Models (1) and (2) represent the two first-stage regressions, and Models (3) and 
(4) represent the two second-stage regressions. We follow Keshk (2003) to estimate the 
models.8 
 Models (1) and (4): 
First stage: RelSize = f(Firm governance, Institutional ownership, No. of blockholders, control 
variables) 
Second stage: Pr(Stock80%=1) = f(control variables, Inst_RelSize) 
 Models (2) and (3): 
                                                          
8 The results are weaker, but qualitatively similar when we apply a standard bivariate probit model without regard 
for any potential simultaneity bias. These additional results are available upon request. We thank an anonymous 
reviewer for suggesting this econometric improvement. 
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First stage: Pr(Stock80%=1) = f(Leverage, Stock price runup, control variables) 
Second stage: Relsize = f(control variables, Inst_Stock80%) 
 The variables Inst_RelSize and Inst_Stock80% are estimated from the first-stage models, 
and are included as instruments in the second-stage models. The rationale for our use of the 
set of governance variables in Models (1) and (4) is that we regard RelSize as a proxy variable 
for the empire building associated with corporate governance quality. Similarly, the rationale 
for our use of Leverage and Stock price runup in Models (2) and (3) is closely tied to the choice 
of payment method. 
Lastly, to examine whether the effect of lower ex ante class action litigation risk on 
acquisition performance is stronger in firms with weaker corporate governance practices, we 
estimate our baseline equation (1) conditional on standard proxies for firm corporate 
governance. We measure corporate governance using the following four proxies: the E-index, 
institutional monitoring, CEO ownership, and CEO duality.  
3. Data sources and variable construction 
3.1. Data sources 
To examine the post-1995 reform period before and after the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals ruling, we obtain a sample of corporate acquisitions for the period between 1996 and 
2003 from the Securities Data Company (SDC) M&A database. We require a minimum deal 
value of USD 1 million, and include only those deals for which the acquiring firm controls less 
than 50% of the target's stock before the announcement, but owns 100% of the target's stock 
after the transaction. We obtain accounting data from Compustat, financial market data from 
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the CRSP, and governance data from ExecuComp and Riskmetrics. Our final sample consists of 
2,549 acquisitions.  
3.2. Firm and deal characteristics  
Following the acquisition literature, we control for a vector of firm and deal 
characteristics that may affect a firm's acquisition decisions. The variable definitions are 
provided in Appendix 1. Our firm-level controls include ln(assets), leverage, Tobin’s Q, free cash 
flow, sales growth, CEO delta, CEO overconfidence, corporate governance quality, and 
institutional investor monitoring. We control for firm size, corporate governance quality, and 
institutional investor monitoring because managers in large firms, poorly governed firms, and 
firms with lower institutional investor monitoring are more entrenched and, hence, are more 
likely to make self-serving acquisitions (Masulis et al., 2007). We control for leverage and free 
cash flow because, as suggested by Jensen (1986), managers in firms with low leverage and 
high free cash flow are likely to engage in empire building. Tobin’s Q and sales growth control 
for market valuation and firm growth opportunities, respectively. We control for CEO delta 
because, as noted by Minnick et al. (2011), managers with high delta compensation perform 
better in acquisitions. We control for CEO overconfidence because Malmendier and Tate (2003) 
show that overconfident CEOs make investment decisions in a different manner to other CEOs. 
All firm characteristics are measured as of the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement. Our deal-level controls include stock price run-up; relative deal size; cross-
border, cross-industry, and tender deal indicators; method of payment; target’s public status; 
high-tech deal indicator; and merger wave. We need to control for stock price runup because it 
could affect the choice of financing and subsequent announcement returns. We control for 
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relative deal size because Moeller et al. (2005) show that acquirers perform worse in large deals. 
We control for cross-border, cross-industry, and tender deal indicators because these deals 
may be conducted for strategic rather than purely financial purposes. We control for method of 
payment because acquirers experience higher announcement returns when paying cash, owing 
to the adverse selection problem (Myers and Majluf, 1984). We control for the target’s public 
status because acquirers capture a liquidity discount when buying private targets (Fuller et al., 
2002). We control for high-tech deals because our sample period falls within the tech bubble, 
which could bias our findings. Finally, we control for merger wave because acquisitions are 
often overvalued during such waves (Rhodes-Kroph and Viswanathan, 2004).  
Following Jenter and Lewellen (2015), we combine multiple governance measures into a 
broader index of governance quality. The set of measures we use includes CEO duality, board 
independence, and an entrenchment index (E-index). To construct the broader index, we split 
each of the governance measures into two groups, with higher values of board independence, 
lower E-index values, and a lack of CEO duality indicating better governance. Then, we 
cumulate the ranks (0–1), which we divide by the number of measures available for the firm-
year to obtain the governance index score.9  
Table 1 describes the sample firm distribution, and presents the variable summary 
statistics. Firms in Ninth Circuit states form the treatment group, and those in other states 
represent the control group. Panel A of Table 1 compares the number of acquisitions between 
the treatment and control groups, and Figure 1 illustrates the time-series trend. We do not 
                                                          
9 We check whether our result holds when we include the E-index and board characteristics separately. Although 
we lose 864 observations doing so, we find qualitatively similar results to those shown in Table 3.  
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observe a significant trend in the number of acquisitions conducted by the treatment and 
control firms. Panel B of Table 1 partitions our sample of acquisitions by the industry in which 
the acquirer operates. Of the acquisitions made by firms in Ninth Circuit states, 54% are 
conducted by acquirers operating in the business equipment industry, accounting for 376 
acquisitions. Of the acquisitions made by firms outside the Ninth Circuit states firms, 26% are 
conducted by acquirers operating in the business equipment industry.  
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
 
Panel C provides summary statistics for the variables used in this study. We present the 
mean values of the variables for the treatment and control groups, as well as their mean 
differences. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. We find 
that 24% of the acquisitions in our sample are made by firms headquartered in Ninth Circuit 
states, which allows for a significant number of treated firms in our empirical setting. The 
average acquirer in our sample has a leverage ratio of 22%, a Tobin’s Q of 2.55, and free cash 
flow of 4%, consistent with the figures reported by other recent M&A studies (e.g., Yim, 2013; 
Huang et al., 2014). The deal characteristics show that 21% of the acquisitions are cross-border 
deals, 44% are cross-industry deals, and 33% are funded entirely by cash. We find that firm and 
deal characteristics differ significantly between firms located within the Ninth circuit (the 
treatment firms) and firms located in other states (the control firms). This could be due to 
industry clustering in certain states. For example, tech firms tend to be headquartered in 
California. To take into account any systematic differences between the two groups of firms, we 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313
 23 
 
control for year, industry, and state fixed effects in all regressions, conduct estimations based 
on a matched sample, and perform a battery of sensitivity analyses.   
4. Shareholder litigation rights and announcement returns 
4.1. Univariate results  
In this section, we analyze the effect of shareholder litigation rights on deal 
announcement returns. We first compare the univariate results for the treatment and control 
groups. Table 2 shows that before the Ninth Circuit ruling, firms in Ninth Circuit states exhibited 
an average five-day CAR of 0.75% around the acquisition announcement date. After the ruling, 
the average CAR decreased to -0.34% for these firms. This change is statistically significant, 
indicating that the reduced threat of shareholder litigation decreased the average five-day CAR 
by 1.09 percentage points. In contrast, for firms located outside the Ninth Circuit states, we find 
that the average five-day CAR decreases by only 0.29 percentage points after the ruling. 
Furthermore, this change is not statistically significant. The univariate results also show that 
before (after) the ruling, the average five-day CAR for the treatment firms was 0.12 (0.68) 
percentage points higher (lower) than that of the control firms; however, these differences are 
nonsignificant. Overall, the univariate results suggest that firms in Ninth Circuit states have 
experienced lower announcement returns since the Ninth Circuit ruling. We next conduct 
multivariate tests to further examine the effect of the Ninth Circuit ruling on acquisition 
performance.  
[Insert Table 2 here] 
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4.2. Baseline results 
4.2.1. Full sample  
Table 3 reports the multivariate test results for the effect of the Ninth Circuit ruling on 
acquisition performance. First, we report the estimation results without control variables in 
Column (1). Here, we find that the estimated coefficient of Treat × Post is negative and 
significant at the 1% level. We then add the firm-level controls to the regression and report the 
results in Column (2). Again, the estimated coefficient of Treat × Post is negative and significant 
at the 1% level. The coefficients of our control variables exhibit the expected signs: 1) CEOs who 
receive higher equity-based compensation have a greater incentive to make value-enhancing 
acquisitions (Minnick et al., 2011); 2) managers in larger firms are more entrenched and, 
therefore, more likely to make value-destroying acquisitions (Masulis et al., 2007); 3) 
overvalued firms (higher Tobin’s Q) are likely to reveal their true value to the market on the 
announcement of an acquisition (Moeller et al., 2004); and 4) acquirers do better when paying 
with cash, owing to the well-documented adverse selection problem (Myers and Maliuf, 1984). 
Our results suggest that a reduced threat of shareholder litigation is associated with lower 
announcement returns. In terms of economic magnitude, the coefficient estimate of Treat × 
Post indicates that after the ruling, acquirers in Ninth Circuit states experienced announcement 
returns that were 1.32 percentage points lower than those of acquirers located in other states. 
This negative market reaction represents a loss of USD 28.19 million in shareholder value for 
the median Ninth Circuit firm in our sample. Overall, these results support hypothesis H1.10  
                                                          
10 To verify that the change in acquisition performance is not related to any other events prior to the ruling, we run 
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[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Because M&As do not take place randomly, our findings could be driven spuriously by 
nonrandom data. Thus, in Column (3), we report the results of a Heckman two-stage model that 
addresses such sample selection bias. In the first stage, we run a probit model using a set of 
firm characteristics to estimate the acquisition likelihood, and then calculate the inverse Mills 
ratio from the probit model residuals.11 We include the inverse Mills ratio in the second-stage 
regression. The results confirm that selection bias has little influence on our findings.  
To control for time-varying industry characteristics (e.g., investment opportunities) that 
might affect corporate acquisition performance, we run the model with industry-year fixed 
effects. A drawback of this approach is that the coefficient of M&A wave is not estimated 
because it is measured as the annual number of acquisitions in a given industry, resulting in 
perfect collinearity. The results reported in Column (4) of Table 3 show a negative coefficient 
estimate for Treat × Post that is statistically significant at the 10% level. In summary, we confirm 
that the acquisition announcement returns of firms in Ninth Circuit states have decreased since 
the ruling. 
The success of a DID estimation rests on the parallel trend assumption being satisfied, 
which requires similar trends in acquirer announcement returns for firms headquartered within 
and outside the Ninth Circuit before the Ninth Circuit ruling. Figure 2 shows that these trends 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
a dynamic regression in which we include lead and lagged effects of the ruling. Though not reported here, the 
results show that a significantly lower CAR(-2, +2) appears only in 2000, a year after the ruling. This confirms that 
the negative reaction was not related to prior events and that the ruling was unexpected. 
11 The results of the probit model are reported in Appendix 2.  
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are similar, suggesting that the parallel trend is satisfied. To formally test the parallel trend 
assumption, we take a sample of 22 treatment and 77 control firms that conducted acquisitions 
in both 1996 and 1999, and compare the trends in the acquisition performance (difference 
between CAR experienced in 1999 and CAR experienced in 1996) of the firms in the two groups. 
We do not find any significant differences between these trends in the pre-event period (t-stat 
= 0.505), indicating that the parallel trend assumption is satisfied.  
4.2.2 Propensity-score matched sample 
  Our comparison of the firm and deal characteristics between the treatment and control 
groups reported in Table 1 shows several significant differences. Thus, to confirm that our 
findings are not driven spuriously by differences in firm or deal characteristics, we use the PSM 
method to identify a control firm for each treatment firm (the matching methodology is 
described in detail in section 2.5). After the matching, we identify 511 matched pairs of 
treatment–control acquisitions, with a total of 1022 acquisitions. Panel A of Table 4 shows that 
all firm and deal characteristics are well-matched between the treatment and control firms. 
Using the matched sample only, we rerun our baseline regression; the results are reported in 
Panel B of Table 4. We find that the coefficient of Treat × Post is -2.180, and is statistically 
significant at the 1% level. Overall, our finding is robust to sample selection bias. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
5. Underlying mechanisms 
5.1. Empire building with overvalued equity  
We expect that the reduced threat of class action litigation for managers of firms 
incorporated in Ninth Circuit states will encourage these managers to manipulate earnings 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313
 27 
 
before acquisitions in order to boost the firm’s stock price, and then use the overvalued stock 
to fund empire-building acquisitions. Our view is shared by Jensen (2005), who suggests that a 
high level of acquirer value destruction can be explained by the agency costs of overvalued 
equity. This view is also supported by the empirical findings of Moeller et al. (2005), who show 
that large-loss bidders have significantly higher market-to-book ratios, and are more likely to 
finance their deals using equity.  
To test our predictions, we first examine whether managers in Ninth Circuit states are 
more likely to make larger acquisitions and use equity financing after the Ninth Circuit ruling. 
Table 5 reports the results. The ordinary least squares regression results reported in Column (1) 
show that managers in Ninth Circuit states did begin acquiring larger firms after it became more 
difficult for shareholders to litigate. In Column (2), the probit regression results show that these 
managers are also more likely to use equity financing after the ruling. These findings support 
hypotheses H2a and H2b. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
However, the choices of deal size and payment method may not be determined 
separately. If so, our findings might be spurious owing to the correlation in the error terms of 
the two regressions. To address this concern, we employ a two-stage PSLM (see section 2.5). 
The results of the PSLM model estimations are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 5. We 
confirm that the reduced threat of class action litigation increases the likelihood of stock-
financed acquisitions and the acquisition of relatively large target firms. 
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5.2. Subsample tests with corporate governance mechanisms 
Next, we conduct cross-sectional tests to identify the types of firms that completed value-
destroying deals after the threat of class action litigation was eased. Shareholder litigation is 
designed to provide recourse if all other governance mechanisms fail. Hence, the external 
governance mechanism of shareholder litigation is unlikely to be needed in firms with good 
internal corporate governance, because such firms can discipline their managers before the 
shareholder litigation stage is reached. In contrast, we expect that the threat of class action 
litigation plays an important governance role in firms with poor internal corporate governance 
because, in these firms, the threat of shareholder litigation provides one of the only ways to 
prevent managers from conducting self-serving acquisitions. Thus, we hypothesize that when 
the Ninth Circuit ruling reduced the threat of shareholder litigation, managers in firms with 
weaker corporate governance became more likely to conduct self-serving value-destroying 
acquisitions, because they had more freedom to do so. To test this hypothesis, we conduct DID 
estimations conditional on standard proxies for firm corporate governance. Consistent with the 
literature, we measure corporate governance using four proxies: the E-index, institutional 
monitoring, CEO ownership, and CEO duality. 
The E-index, first introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009), is based on six of the 24 anti-
takeover provisions included in the G-index originally constructed by Gompers et al. (2003), 
where a higher value corresponds to weaker corporate governance. Using the G-index as a 
measure of corporate governance, Masulis et al. (2007) find that acquirers with more anti-
takeover provisions are more likely to conduct empire-building acquisitions that destroy 
shareholder value. Bebchuk et al. (2009) determine that the six governance provisions in the E-
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index matter most in terms of excessive management power. We classify firms as having 
stronger (weaker) corporate governance if the firm has an E-index score of two or less (above 
two). Columns (1) and (2) of Table 6 present the results. We find that the value destruction 
stems from firms with higher E-index scores. This finding is expected, because the managers of 
these poorly governed firms located within Ninth Circuit states are likely to have had greater 
freedom to conduct self-serving acquisitions since the ruling. 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
Recent evidence shows that institutional investors play a significant role in corporate 
governance. Cheng at al. (2010) show that class actions led by institutional investors increased 
between 1995 and 2004, and appeared to be effective in disciplining management. Aggarwal et 
al. (2015) show that institutional investors value their votes and use the proxy process to affect 
corporate governance. McCahery et al. (2016) find that 45% of the institutional investors they 
surveyed have had private discussions with the corporate board without management present. 
Furthermore, Liu et al. (2019) find that institutional investor monitoring strengthens board 
oversight. We measure institutional monitoring as the number of institutional owners 
(blockholders) that hold more than 5% of a firm’s shares, because we expect that institutional 
investors who own larger portions of a firm’s shares will have a greater incentive and ability to 
discipline managers. The results are reported in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 6, and support 
hypothesis H3. Here, we find that the value destruction is concentrated in acquirers with fewer 
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blockholders, because managers in these Ninth Circuit firms are more likely to conduct self-
serving acquisitions, given the reduction in the threat of shareholder litigation.12  
 According to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, larger managerial ownership 
reduces agency costs significantly, thus reflecting a better corporate governance mechanism. 
Although further studies show that this negative relationship is nonlinear, we concur with 
Lilienfeld-Toal and Ruenzi (2014), who show that firms with higher CEO ownership exhibit 
better stock performance. They suggest that managerial ownership can also be considered an 
internal corporate governance device that is distinct from the external governance mechanisms 
studied by Gompers et al. (2003). Thus, we use CEO ownership as our third proxy for corporate 
governance quality. Assuming the positive relationship between managerial ownership and firm 
value holds, CEOs with greater exposure to the firm’s stock are less likely to undertake value-
destroying acquisitions. The results in Columns (5) and (6) of Table 6 suggest that the value 
destruction caused by the reduced threat of litigation is a significant issue for firms with lower 
CEO ownership.  
As a final proxy for corporate governance, we use CEO duality. Finkelstein and D'Aveni 
(1994) consider CEO duality a “double-edged sword,” owing to the trade-off between the 
effectiveness of having a CEO who also serves as the chairperson of the board of directors, and 
the independent board monitoring made possible by separating these two roles. According to 
stewardship theory (Donaldson and Davis, 1991), CEO duality is beneficial to shareholders. In 
                                                          
12 On a separate note, the difference between the estimated coefficients for firms with low and high numbers of 
blockholders is not statistically significant, implying that our finding is not driven by a shift in ownership to 
institutional investors after the ruling documented by Crane and Koch (2018). 
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contrast, agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) suggests that CEO duality hinders the 
monitoring role of the board of directors. The relationship between CEO duality and firm 
performance remains inconclusive, and determining it lies outside the scope of these two 
theories (Krause et al., 2014). Here, we lean toward the agency theory point of view. Inspired 
by Masulis et al. (2007), who find a significant negative relationship between CEO duality and 
bidder returns, we expect a CEO who also chairs the board of directors to have more 
opportunities to pursue their personal interests when implementing M&A transactions. As such, 
we predict that the value destruction related to the reduced threat of shareholder litigation is 
significant in firms where the CEO is also the chairperson of the board of directors. The results 
in Columns (7) and (8) of Table 6 support our prediction. 
6. Additional evidence and sensitivity analyses 
In this section, we conduct three additional tests related to the Ninth Circuit ruling, as 
well as a battery of sensitivity analyses on the effect of the ruling on acquirer announcement 
returns.  
6.1. Managerial forecasting error with lower threat of shareholder litigation 
 Studies have shown that the threat of litigation affects financial reporting behavior. For 
example, Hopkins (2018) investigates whether the risk of securities class actions affects the 
level of misreporting. He finds that, since the Ninth Circuit ruling, managers of firms in Ninth 
Circuit states have issued more restatements than those of firms in other states. Following this 
line of thought, we expect that the reduced threat of shareholder litigation encourages 
managers to issue material misstatements around acquisition announcements. Using 
managerial earnings per share (EPS) forecasting data from I/B/E/S (formerly First Call), we test 
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whether the reduced threat of litigation causes managers to be overly optimistic when 
announcing future earnings. To ensure managers’ earnings forecasts are linked to an upcoming 
M&A, we limit our analysis to annual management EPS forecasts one year prior to M&A deals.13 
Following prior management forecast studies (e.g., Feng et al., 2009), we construct two 
variables to measure managerial EPS forecasting error: Abs(Fore_Error) and Fore_Error. 
Abs(Fore_Error) is the absolute value of Fore_Error, the management’s EPS forecast minus the 
actual EPS, divided by the lagged calendar-end stock price. We report the results in Panel A of 
Table 7. We find that the reduction in the threat of shareholder litigation after the ruling 
increases management optimism when future earnings are announced. More specifically, we 
find that, after the ruling, management earnings forecasting errors announced in firms located 
in Ninth Circuit states increased by 2.15 cents compared with those of firms in other states. The 
increased margin seems mostly driven by inflated EPS estimations in forecasting. After the 
ruling, firms located in Ninth Circuit states report EPS forecasts 1.93 cents higher than those of 
firms in other states. Overall, our findings suggest that the reduced threat of class action 
litigation encourages managers to be overly optimistic in terms of future earnings 
announcements surrounding M&A deals. These results are consistent with the findings of 
Hopkins (2018), who shows that firms affected by the ruling exhibit higher probabilities of 
restatement than those not affected by the ruling do.  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
                                                          
13 We also tried the quarterly EPS forecast, but failed to find significant results. Please see the discussion on the 
limitations of quarterly EPS forecast data in Ajinkya et al. (2005). 
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6.2. Earnings management with a lower threat of shareholder litigation  
M&As and earnings management are the two most commonly cited reasons for federal 
class action suits (Crutchley et al., 2015), and studies have found that these two reasons often 
co-exist. For example, Louis (2004) shows that acquiring firms often overstate earnings in the 
quarter prior to a stock swap announcement in order to boost their stock prices. Furthermore, 
Gong et al. (2008) find that acquirers who manipulate their earnings before stock offers are 
more likely to attract subsequent lawsuits. Thus, we expect the reduced threat of shareholder 
litigation encourages managers to manipulate earnings before an acquisition, because they 
have a lower probability of being caught, and to then use this overvalued stock to fund empire-
building acquisitions. We examine acquirers’ earnings management using a modified Jones 
model and quarterly financial data from Compustat to estimate abnormal accruals in the 
quarter prior to a deal announcement (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). Note that the sample 
size shrinks significantly owing to missing quarterly values for the variables required to calculate 
the abnormal accruals. The results are reported in Panel B of Table 7. Consistent with our 
predictions, we find that, after the ruling, compared with managers of firms in other states, 
those of firms in Ninth Circuit states manage earnings significantly upward in the quarter before 
an acquisition; however, this relationship holds only in the case of stock offers. In summary, our 
results show that the reduced threat of class action litigation has given managers greater 
freedom to conduct self-serving acquisitions using overvalued equity, which destroys 
shareholder value.  
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6.3. Probability of CEO turnover  
As a final test related to the Ninth Circuit ruling, we ask whether the reduced threat of 
class action litigation affects the likelihood of CEO replacement. Prior research has documented 
the role of shareholder litigation in executive and director discipline in defendant firms. For 
example, Fich and Shivdasani (2007) report that outside directors are likely to lose their other 
outside directorships after a lawsuit, and Humphery-Jenner (2012) finds that shareholder class 
action litigation increases the likelihood of CEO turnover. Given the documented disciplinary 
role of shareholder litigation, we expect the reduced threat of litigation after the Ninth Circuit 
ruling to increase managerial entrenchment, which, in turn, decreases the probability of 
termination. This hypothesis is consistent with Appel’s (2019) finding that reduced shareholder 
litigation rights allow managers to adopt classified boards, supermajority voting requirements, 
and poison pills. 
To investigate whether the Ninth Circuit ruling affects the likelihood of CEO replacement, 
especially when CEOs are engaged in value-decreasing M&As, we merge our sample of 
acquirers with the Execucomp database. The merged database is used to examine the 
probability of CEO turnover in firms involved in value-decreasing M&As between 1996 and 
2003, around the time of the ruling. We obtain CEO turnover and forced CEO turnover data 
from Professor Andrea Eisfeldt’s website.14 Forced CEO turnovers are identified based on news 
                                                          
14 The limitation of studying CEO turnover is that little is known about why CEOs are replaced. It might be that, 
upon mutual agreement, the departure is announced for other reasons (e.g., health issues), even though the real 
reason is poor performance. Parrino (1997) and Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) note that a planned CEO departure is 
announced at least six months prior to the succession. They classify a CEO replacement as a forced turnover if 
news articles report “a CEO is fired or left the firm due to policy differences or pressure from the board of 
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stories published in Factiva.15 For this analysis, we limit our sample to firms that engage in 
acquisitions. Thus, we predict the probability of CEO replacement conditional on acquisition 
performance. Specifically, we set up the following regression: 
Pr(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 = 1) =  𝑓(𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡 ×  𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑡 ×  𝑁𝑒𝑔𝑀&𝐴, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠),                                 (2) 
where Turnover represents CEO Turnover or Forced CEO Turnover, which are indicators that 
take the value one if a CEO is replaced or forced out, respectively, within two years of an 
acquisition, and zero otherwise. Then, NegM&A is an indicator that takes the value one if the 
average five-day announcement return is negative, and zero otherwise. The regression includes 
observations at the firm-year level. We expect the coefficient of Treat x Post x NegM&A to be 
negative, implying that a lower likelihood of shareholder litigation reduces CEO replacement in 
the case of negative M&A performance. 
Panel C of Table 7 shows the results of the logistic regressions. In Column (1), we find a 
negative coefficient of Treat x Post x NegM&A on the probability of CEO turnover after the 
ruling for firms in Ninth Circuit states, compared with that of firms in other states; however, the 
coefficient is not statistically significant. Column (2) presents the marginal effect of each 
variable. Column (3) shows that, after the ruling, the likelihood of forced CEO replacement is 
affected significantly by engaging in value-decreasing M&As (NegM&A). From an economic 
viewpoint, after the ruling, the likelihood of forced CEO replacement decreases by 3.4 
percentage points when M&A announcement returns are negative, as shown in Column (4). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
directors.” While we are unable to trace the true reason why a CEO departs, we assume that an M&A failure is a 
critical event that results in CEO replacement. 
15 https://sites.google.com/site/andrealeisfelft/. See Eisfeldt and Kuhnen (2013) for a detailed explanation of the 
information-collection process. 
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Overall, these findings suggest that the reduced threat of being fired since the ruling 
significantly reduces CEO turnover, even for firms with poor acquisition performance. This is 
one of the reasons why managers in Ninth Circuit states can conduct value-destroying, empire-
building acquisitions, providing further evidence that the threat of shareholder litigation plays a 
monitoring role in the dismissal of managers who perform poorly.  
6.4. Sensitivity analyses  
Finally, we conduct a series of sensitivity analyses to further confirm the documented 
effect of the Ninth Circuit ruling on acquirer returns. First, we address the concern that our 
results may be driven by the burst of the tech bubble, which occurred during our study period. 
We conduct three separate robustness tests to address this concern: 1) we exclude tech firms 
from our baseline regression, using an indicator that takes the value one if the acquirer and 
target firms are both from high-tech industries (Loughran and Ritter, 2004); 2) we exclude the 
period 1999 to 2000 from our sample; and 3) we exclude firms located in Silicon Valley. We 
obtain the address of a firm’s headquarters from Compustat and use the city name to identify 
whether the firm is located in Silicon Valley.16 The results reported in Columns (1) to (3) in Panel 
A of Table 8 show that our finding still holds. To further address the concern that the tech 
bubble may drive our results, we extend our sample to 2015. The unreported results are 
qualitatively similar to our original results, and are consistent with the finding of Cox et al. 
(2009) that, despite numerous efforts by the Supreme Court, differences in pleading standards 
persist across circuits. 
                                                          
16 A firm is identified as being in Silicon Valley if it is located in one of the following cities in California: San Jose, 
Palo Alto, Menlo Park, Cupertino, Santa Clara, Mountain View, or Sunnyvale 
(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Silicon_Valley). 
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[Insert Table 8 here] 
Second, we employ a border analysis, following Holmes (1998), to address the possible 
selection bias, because acquisition decisions are typically not made in random places as firms 
do not randomly select their locations. We obtain zip codes (from the U.S. census) for counties 
that share state borders with Ninth Circuit states and other states, and repeat our analysis for 
the firms located around the state borders. That is, the treated firms are those with 
headquarters in Montana, Idaho, Nevada, or Arizona, and the control firms are those with 
headquarters in Utah, New Mexico, Wyoming, or North Dakota. Column (4) in Panel A of Table 
8 reports the results. Firms headquartered in these states completed only 50 M&A transactions 
during the period 1996–2003; thus, we include only industry fixed effects in the regression in 
order to avoid multicollinearity. The coefficient of Treat × Post remains negative and significant. 
Third, Compustat does not capture headquarter relocations because it backfills firm 
addresses. To ensure that the locations of the firms’ headquarters are accurate, we obtain 
information on relocations from the firms’ SEC Form 10-K filings to update our sample firms’ 
addresses. We rerun our baseline regressions and one of the robustness tests, excluding firms 
in Silicon Valley. Overall, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported previously. The 
results from the baseline model for the full sample in Column (5) are shown in Panel B of Table 
8.   
Fourth, UD laws have been shown to positively affect acquisition performance. Therefore, 
we control for the staggered implementation of these laws (Chu and Zhao, 2019). Column (6) in 
Panel B of Table 8 provides the results. We find that the estimated coefficient of Treat × Post is 
similar in magnitude to those in the main analysis, and is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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Consistent with Chu and Zhao’s (2019) finding, the coefficient of UD Laws is positive, but is not 
statistically significant. 
Fifth, we control for other legal changes related to shareholder litigation and anti-
takeover provisions to ensure that these changes are not driving our results. Following Karpoff 
and Wittry (2018), we control for various state anti-takeover laws, including control share 
acquisition, business combination, fair price, directors’ duties, and poison-pill laws. Column (7) 
in Panel B of Table 8 shows the results. After adding these control variables, we again find that 
the estimated coefficient of Treat × Post is similar in magnitude and significance to those in the 
main analysis.  
Sixth, several studies argue that shareholder litigation affects firms’ disclosure and 
information environments. For example, Bourveau et al. (2018) find that firms increase their 
disclosure significantly after UD laws that make it more difficult for shareholders to claim 
derivative lawsuits. Houston et al. (2019) report that the threat of shareholder litigation 
encourages voluntary disclosure practices. Similarly, Hopkins (2018) concludes that the threat 
of shareholder litigation can discipline managers and deter financial misreporting. However, 
Boone et al. (2019) show that, although managers increase their voluntary disclosure levels 
owing to the reduced threat of shareholder litigation, firms provide lower-quality financial 
reporting overall after UD laws are passed. Another strand of the literature argues that 
disclosure is related to M&A behavior. For example, Hope and Thomas (2008) conclude that 
disclosure requirements limit managers’ abilities to engage in empire building. These studies 
suggest that a reduced threat of shareholder litigation affects disclosure, which may, in turn, 
affect M&A behavior. To address this concern, we control for two variables that capture a firm’s 
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information quality: Restate and Ln(Analysts). Here, Restate is equal to one if a firm restates its 
financial statements in a given fiscal year, and zero otherwise, and Ln(Analysts) is the log-
transformed number of unique analysts (plus one) that issue a firm’s earnings forecasts. 
Column (8) in Panel B of Table 8 presents the results. We find that the coefficient of Treat × 
Post remains negative and statistically significant. Furthermore, Restate is positively associated 
with acquirer announcement returns,17 whereas Ln(Analyst) is negatively associated with 
acquirer announcement returns. However, these associations are nonsignificant.  
 Seventh, we repeat our baseline model analysis using a three-day event window. We 
report the results using CAR (-1, +1) as an alternative dependent variable in Panel C of Table 8. 
The coefficient of Treat × Post is still similar in magnitude and significance to those of the main 
analysis. 
 
7. Conclusion 
It is well recognized in the M&A literature that, in the absence of strong corporate 
governance, managers have an incentive to conduct empire-building acquisitions that destroy 
shareholder value. Shareholder litigation rights, a governance mechanism designed to provide 
recourse in the event that all other governance mechanisms fail, should theoretically play an 
important external governance role in disciplining the managers of poorly governed firms, thus 
increasing shareholder value. However, because many lawsuits are triggered by unexpected 
decreases in stock prices, we often find that shareholder litigation in practice is simply a 
                                                          
17 Although this finding suggests that firms that restate results tend to exhibit higher positive announcement 
returns, it cannot exclude the possibility that acquiring firms that exhibit better announcement returns are more 
likely to restate their financial statements than are firms with worse announcement returns in a given fiscal year. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313
 40 
 
method by which shareholders and lawyers extract wealth from defendant corporations. 
Managers are therefore encouraged to conduct acquisitions that minimize downside risk rather 
than maximizing shareholder value. As a result, the threat of shareholder litigation may also be 
detrimental to shareholder value.  
In this study, we specifically examine how the threat of class action litigation affects 
managers’ acquisition decisions in order to determine whether shareholder litigation rights 
serve as an effective governance mechanism that prevents managers from conducting self-
serving acquisitions at the expense of shareholder value. To establish a causal relationship, we 
use the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals July 2, 1999 ruling, In re: Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities 
Litigation, which generated an exogenous reduction in shareholder class action litigation rights 
for firms located in Ninth Circuit states.  
The results of a DID analysis show that, after the ruling, firms located in Ninth Circuit 
states experienced significantly lower deal announcement returns, especially for acquirers with 
weaker corporate governance. Furthermore, we find that value destruction occurs as a result of 
managers’ freedom to conduct empire-building acquisitions using equity that has been 
overvalued via inflated earnings. Overall, we show that regulatory changes that reduce the 
threat of class actions are not in the best interests of shareholders, because their collective 
power to litigate serves as an important governance tool, particularly in the event of M&As. Our 
empirical evidence suggests that the governance power provided by shareholder class action 
litigation effectively reduces managers’ incentives to engage in empire building at the expense 
of shareholder value.  
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Figure 1. Acquisition activities 
 
This figure shows the number of acquisitions made by firms in Ninth Circuit states versus that of 
firms in other circuits, before and after the Ninth Circuit Ruling. The Ninth Circuit ruling was 
announced on July 2, 1999, as indicated by the reference line. 
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Figure 2. Acquisition outcomes 
 
This figure shows the five-day cumulative abnormal returns experienced by acquirers in Ninth 
Circuit states versus that of firms in other circuits, before and after the Ninth Circuit ruling. The 
Ninth Circuit ruling was announced on July 2, 1999, as indicated by the reference line. 
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Table 1 
 Sample distribution and summary statistics  
 
This table presents the sample of firms by year and industry. Panel A reports the annual number of 
acquisitions for the treatment and control groups, Panel B reports the number of acquisitions across 
industries for the two groups, and Panel C reports the summary statistics for the main variables, 
constructed from the sample of firms for the period 1996 to 2003. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
 
Panel A. Acquisitions by Year 
  
Number of acquisitions by treatment 
firms 
Number of acquisitions by 
control firms 
1996 72 196 
1997 35 231 
1998 63 251 
1999 89 283 
2000 93 264 
2001 76 240 
2002 101 214 
2003 78 263 
 
Panel B. Acquisitions by Acquirer Industry 
  
Number of acquisitions by treatment 
firms 
Number of acquisitions 
by control firms 
Consumer nondurables 21 121 
Consumer durables 6 74 
Manufacturing 42 397 
Oil, gas, and coal 13 134 
Chemical products 7 91 
Business equipment 376 501 
Telephone and television 6 95 
Wholesale and retail 32 160 
Healthcare 50 219 
Finance  0 7 
Other 54 143 
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3086313
  
Panel C. Summary Statistics  
  N Mean Q1 Std. dev. Median Q3 (1) Treat (2) Control Diff [(1) – (2)] 
       (N = 607) (N = 1,942)  
Treat 2,549 0.24 0.00 0.43 0.00 0.00 -- -- -- 
Post 2,549 0.52 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.57 0.51 0.07*** 
CAR (-2, +2) in % 2,549 0.40 –3.41 7.20 0.23 4.04 0.12 0.48 -0.36 
CEO delta 2,549 0.93 0.13 1.82 0.33 0.87 1.34 0.80 0.54*** 
CEO overconfidence 2,549 0.43 0.19 0.29 0.43 0.66 0.52 0.40 0.11*** 
Ln(Assets) 2,549 7.51 6.36 1.61 7.32 8.51 7.14 7.62 -0.48*** 
Leverage 2,549 0.22 0.10 0.16 0.22 0.32 0.17 0.24 -0.08*** 
Tobin’s Q 2,549 2.55 1.40 2.05 1.84 2.83 3.43 2.27 1.16*** 
Free cash flow 2,549 0.04 0.02 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.00 
Sales growth 2,549 0.26 0.04 0.54 0.13 0.32 0.42 0.21 0.21*** 
Firm governance 2,549 0.38 0.00 0.32 0.33 0.67 0.43 0.37 0.06*** 
Institutional ownership 2,549 0.65 0.54 0.17 0.67 0.78 0.64 0.66 -0.02** 
No. of blockholders 2,549 1.72 0.75 1.21 1.75 2.50 1.72 1.72 0.00 
Stock price runup 2,549 -0.04 -0.33 0.50 -0.06 0.24 -0.01 -0.04 0.03 
Relative deal size 2,549 0.12 0.01 0.25 0.03 0.12 0.10 0.13 -0.03** 
High tech 2,549 0.29 0.00 0.45 0.00 1.00 0.53 0.22 0.31*** 
Cross border 2,549 0.21 0.00 0.41 0.00 0.00 0.17 0.22 -0.05*** 
Cross industry 2,549 0.44 0.00 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.38 0.45 -0.07*** 
Tender deal 2,549 0.08 0.00 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.09 -0.02* 
All-cash deal 2,549 0.33 0.00 0.47 0.00 1.00 0.33 0.33 0.00 
Private target 2,549 0.38 0.00 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.50 0.35 0.15*** 
M&A wave 2,549 5.10 0.98 4.45 5.08 5.56 5.40 5.00 0.40*** 
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Table 2 
Univariate analysis 
 
This table presents the mean values of acquirers’ five-day cumulative abnormal returns around the 
acquisition announcement date, CAR (-2,+2), for the treatment and control groups, as well as the 
differences between the means of the two groups and within each group before and after the U.S. Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals ruling of July 2, 1999. The treatment group includes firms headquartered in 
states under the jurisdiction of the Ninth Circuit Court, and the control group includes firms in other 
states. Statistical significance at the 10% and 1% levels is indicated by * and ***, respectively. The t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
  Treatment Control 
 
(1) Pre (2) Post Diff [(2) – (1)] (3) Pre (4) Post Diff [(4) – (3)] 
CAR (–2, +2) (N = 256) (N = 348)  (N = 961) (N = 981)  
 0.75 -0.34 -1.09* 0.63*** 0.34 -0.29 
  (1.63) (-0.74) (1.67) (2.92) (1.50) (0.92) 
   Diff [(1) – (3)] = 0.12 (-0.26)   
   Diff [(2) – (4)) = -0.68 (-1.32)   
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Table 3 
Threat of shareholder litigation and announcement returns 
 
This table reports the results from the regressions of the threat of shareholder litigation on acquirer 
announcement returns. The variation in the threat of shareholder litigation is identified by the Ninth 
Circuit ruling of July 2, 1999. The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors, clustered by 
acquirer headquarters state, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1.  
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  CAR (–2, +2) 
Treat × Post -1.260*** -1.324*** -1.898*** -1.211* 
 
(-2.80) (-2.96) (-4.20) (-1.99) 
Treat 0.183 0.311 1.046* 0.760 
 
(0.37) (0.61) (1.86) (1.25) 
CEO delta 
 
0.236*** 0.323*** 0.300*** 
  
(2.85) (3.64) (2.87) 
CEO overconfidence 
 
-0.256 -0.890 -0.988* 
  
(-0.54) (-1.61) (-1.72) 
Ln(Assets) 
 
-0.462*** -0.463** -0.327 
  
(-3.47) (-2.62) (-1.53) 
Leverage 
 
1.037 1.385 0.445 
  
(0.83) (0.94) (0.28) 
Tobin’s Q 
 
-0.154** -0.131* -0.106 
  
(-2.19) (-1.89) (-1.66) 
Free cash flow 
 
-0.706 -1.127 -1.048 
  
(-0.23) (-0.34) (-0.31) 
Sales growth 
 
-0.102 -0.156 -0.370* 
  
(-0.40) (-0.63) (-1.69) 
Firm governance 
 
-0.387 -0.555 -0.727 
  
(-0.93) (-1.04) (-1.44) 
Institutional ownership 
 
0.277 0.431 0.460 
  
(0.21) (0.35) (0.30) 
No. of blockholders 
 
-0.201 -0.147 -0.145 
  
(-1.11) (-0.84) (-0.70) 
Stock price runup 
 
-1.670*** -1.665** -1.966*** 
  
(-3.11) (-2.62) (-2.79) 
Relative deal size 
 
-1.808** -1.929* -1.810 
  
(-2.13) (-1.87) (-1.47) 
Cross-border 
 
0.123 0.289 0.295 
  
(0.28) (0.64) (0.71) 
Cross-industry 
 
0.181 -0.004 0.216 
  
(0.65) (-0.01) (0.63) 
Tender deal 
 
0.120 0.168 0.324 
  
(0.27) (0.49) (0.76) 
All-cash deal 
 
0.615* 0.519* 0.548 
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(1.85) (1.69) (1.56) 
Private target 
 
-0.168 -0.169 0.155 
  
(-0.43) (-0.47) (0.46) 
High-tech 
 
-0.148 -0.307 -0.360 
  
(-0.34) (-0.69) (-0.76) 
M&A wave 
 
-0.001 -0.002 
 
  
(-0.72) (-1.18) 
 
Inverse Mills ratio 
  
0.019 -0.015 
   
(0.01) (-0.01) 
Constant -0.010 3.000 3.423 6.276** 
 
(-0.01) (1.23) (0.99) (2.12) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry-year FE No No No Yes 
Incorporation state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,549 2,549 2,186 2,186 
R2 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.16 
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Table 4 
Propensity score matching 
 
This table presents the results for a two-stage model that uses propensity score matching (PSM) to 
address sample selection bias. Panel A reports the post-match differences in the matching variables, and 
Panel B presents the results from the baseline regression run only on the PSM matched sample. The t-
statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by acquirer headquarters state, and are 
displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and 
***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
Panel A: Post-match differences     
 
(1) Treat (2) Control 
Diff [(1) – (2)] abs (t-statistics) 
  (N=511) (N=511) 
CEO delta 0.99 0.97 0.02 0.18 
CEO overconfidence 0.47 0.49 -0.02 0.99 
Ln(Assets) 7.16 7.13 0.03 0.30 
Leverage 0.18 0.18 0.00 0.05 
Tobin’s Q 2.83 2.78 0.05 0.36 
Free cash flow 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.03 
Sales growth 0.30 0.30 0.00 0.02 
Firm governance 0.42 0.41 0.01 0.17 
Institutional ownership 0.64 0.65 -0.01 0.61 
No. of blockholders 1.76 1.85 -0.09 1.18 
Stock price runup 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.11 
Relative deal size 0.11 0.11 0.00 0.13 
Cross border 0.19 0.19 0.00 0.16 
Cross industry 0.41 0.41 0.00 0.13 
Tender deal 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.00 
All-cash deal 0.33 0.32 0.01 0.33 
Private target 0.47 0.47 0.00 0.06 
High tech 0.44 0.43 0.01 0.31 
M&A wave 5.28 5.20 0.08 1.31 
Panel B. Matched sample DID test results  
  (1) 
 CAR (-2, +2) 
Treat × Post -2.180*** 
 
(-2.77) 
Controls and Constant Yes 
Year FE Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Year × Industry FE No 
Incorporation state FE Yes 
Number of observations 1022 
R2 0.119 
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Table 5 
Threat of shareholder litigation on relative deal size and method of payment 
 
This table reports the results from the regressions of the threat of shareholder litigation on deal size and 
payment method. The variation in the threat of shareholder litigation is identified by the Ninth Circuit 
ruling of July 2, 1999. RelSize represents the relative deal size. Stock80% is an indicator variable equal to 
one if 80% of the acquisition is funded using stock. The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard 
errors clustered by acquirer headquarters state, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance 
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in 
Appendix 1. 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  OLS Probit Two Stage Probit Least Squares 
 
RelSize Pr (Stock80%) = 1 RelSize Pr(Stock80% = 1) 
Treat × Post 0.046** 0.297** 0.042* 0.434** 
 
(2.01) (1.99)  (1.68)   (2.32) 
Treat -0.027 -0.047 -0.030* -0.132 
 
(-1.49) (-0.42)  (-1.68)  (-0.96)  
CEO delta -0.001 -0.028 0.001 -0.022 
 
(-0.19) (-1.06) (0.02) (-0.97) 
CEO overconfidence -0.040* 0.107 -0.047** -0.029 
 
(-6.90) (0.74) (-2.28) (-0.15)  
Ln(Assets) -0.028*** 0.056** -0.026*** -0.039 
 
(-6.42) (2.08)  (-6.02)  (-0.65) 
Leverage 0.110*** -0.448* 
 
-0.128 
 
(3.11) (-1.79) 
 
(-0.37) 
Tobin’s Q -0.010*** 0.100*** -0.014** 0.063** 
 
(-2.93) (4.72) (-2.50)  (2.02)  
Free cash flow -0.005 -2.279*** 0.007 -2.326*** 
 
(-.077) (-5.51)  (0.06)   (-4.77) 
Sales growth 0.002 0.215*** -0.020 0.207*** 
 
(0.03) (3.41) (-0.01)  (2.79)  
Firm governance 10.013 0.184* -0.018 
 
 
(-0.89) (1.79)   (-1.03)    
 
Institutional ownership -0.163*** 0.430 -0.186*** 
 
 
(-4.11) (1.54)  (-4.42) 
 
No. of blockholders 0.022*** -0.072* 0.026*** 
 
 
(3.88) (-1.76)  (4.20)  
 
Stock price runup 0.023*** 0.205*** 
 
0.281*** 
 
(2.39) (3.18) 
 
 (3.22) 
Cross border -0.057*** -0.614*** -0.045* -0.797*** 
 
(-4.84) (-6.24) (-1.67)  (-5.66) 
Cross industry -0.039*** 0.081 -0.043*** -0.037 
 
(-3.86) (1.16) (-4.00) (-0.36) 
Tender deal 0.079*** -0.822*** 0.091** -0.572*** 
 
(4.38) (-4.71)  (2.43)  (-2.56) 
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Private target -0.079*** 0.108 -0.082*** -0.130 
 
(-7.39) (1.51)  (-7.21)  (-0.88) 
High tech -0.002 0.259*** -0.014 0.262*** 
 
(-0.20) (2.98) (-0.79)  (2.60) 
M&A wave -0.014** 0.077 -0.018** 0.030 
 
(-2.10) (1.61) (-2.41)  (0.50) 
Inst_stock80% 
  
0.018 
 
   
 (0.46) 
 
Inst_relsize 
   
-3.095** 
    
 (-1.99) 
Constant 0.127 -2.263***  0.646*** -0.405 
 
(1.14) (-5.98)  (5.99)    (-0.55) 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incorp state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,549 2,549 2,549 2,549 
R2/Pseudo R2 0.148 0.213 0.146 0.204 
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Table 6 
Subsample analyses 
This table reports the results from the regressions of the threat of shareholder litigation on acquirer announcement returns, conditional on 
the quality of corporate governance. The variation in the threat of shareholder litigation is identified by the Ninth Circuit ruling of July 2, 1999. 
The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by acquirer headquarters state, and are displayed in parentheses. 
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  E-index Number of blockholders CEO ownership CEO duality 
 
Dep.= CAR(-2, +2) 
 
Low High Low High Low High No Yes 
Treat × Post -0.675 -1.045* -1.748** -0.629 -1.407*** -0.845 -0.551 -1.638** 
 
(-0.63) (-1.86) (-2.22) (-1.09) (-2.91) (-1.11) (-0.40) (-2.13) 
 
H0: β(1) = β(2) H0: β(3) = β(4) H0: β(5) = β(6) H0: β(7) = β(8) 
 
(0.741) (0.194) (0.501) (0.560) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incorporation state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 583 1,311 1,183 1,366 1,271 1,278 805 1,744 
R2 0.158 0.099 0.109 0.097 0.116 0.095 0.162 0.089 
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Table 7 
Additional evidence 
 
This table reports the results of additional tests. Panel A reports the results of regressions of the threat 
of shareholder litigation on management EPS forecasts within a year before an acquisition. Fore_Error is 
the difference between management’s EPS forecast and the actual EPS, divided by the lagged calendar-
end stock price. Abs(Fore_Error) is the absolute value of Fore_Error. Ln(1+duration) is the natural 
logarithm of one plus the number of days from the announcement date of the management’s earnings 
forecast to the announcement date of the M&A deal. Panel B reports the results of regressions of the 
threat of shareholder litigation on earnings management in the quarter before an acquisition. Abnormal 
accruals are calculated using the modified Jones model (Jones, 1991; Dechow et al., 1995). Panel C 
reports the results of logistic regressions of the threat of shareholder litigation on the likelihood of CEO 
turnover. The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by the state of the 
acquirer headquarters, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
Panel A: Managerial Forecasting Error   
  (1) (2) 
  Abs(Fore_Error) Fore_Error 
Treat × Post 2.150* 1.931** 
 
(1.75) (2.27) 
Treat -0.844 0.190 
 
(-0.55) (0.18) 
Controls Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Incorporation state FE Yes Yes 
Observations 694 694 
R2 0.204 0.130 
Panel B: Earnings Management    
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
Abnormal accruals 
  Full sample All-cash deals Stock deals 
Treat × Post 1.469*** -0.147 2.328*** 
 
(3.56) (-0.19) (6.66) 
  
H0: β(1) = β(2) 
  
(0.003) 
Treat -1.592*** -0.640 -1.707*** 
 
(-8.21) (-1.41) (-6.94) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
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Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Incorporation state FE Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,719 573 1,146 
R2 0.11 0.20 0.15 
Panel C: CEO Turnover     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Pr (CEO Turnover) = 1 Pr (forced CEO Turnover) = 1 
  
marginal effect 
 
marginal effect 
Treat x Post × NegM&A -0.332 -0.058 -2.789*** -0.039 
 
(-0.98) 
 
(-3.23) 
 Treat × Post 0.084 0.016 0.660 0.025 
 
(0.38) 
 
(0.69) 
 Post × NegM&A -0.475** -0.085 -0.401 -0.011 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-0.55) 
 Treat × NegM&A 0.681** 0.143 0.725 0.029 
 
(2.45) 
 
(1.06) 
 Treat -0.598** -0.104 -0.332 -0.010 
 
(-2.04) 
 
(-0.47) 
 NegM&A 0.244 0.046 0.291 0.009 
 
(1.07) 
 
(0.56) 
 Post 0.086 0.016 -0.740 -0.024 
 
(0.26) 
 
(-0.63) 
 Controls Yes 
 
Yes 
 Constant Yes 
 
Yes 
 Year FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 Industry FE Yes 
 
Yes 
 Incorporation state FE Yes Yes 
Number of observations 1,626 1,626 
Pseudo R2 0.125 0.158 
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Table 8 
Sensitivity analyses 
 
This table presents the results of a series of sensitivity analyses. The variation in the threat of 
shareholder litigation is identified by the Ninth Circuit ruling of July 2, 1999. In Columns (1), (2), and (3) 
of Panel A, we exclude tech firms, the years 1999 and 2000, and Silicon Valley firms, respectively. In 
Column (4), we limit our analysis to border states in the Ninth Circuit jurisdiction. In Column (5) of Panel 
B, we use headquarters information from SEC Form 10-K filings. In Column (6), we include UD laws. In 
Column (7), we control for various state anti-takeover laws, including control share acquisition, business 
combination, fair price, directors’ duties, and poison pill laws. In Column (8), we additionally control for 
a firm’s information quality by including Restate and Ln(Analyst). In Panel C, we consider an alternative 
event window of (-1, +1). The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors clustered by 
acquirer headquarters state, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
 
Panel A     
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Exclude tech 
firms  
Exclude 99 & 
00 
Exclude firms 
in Silicon 
Valley 
Firms around 
state borders 
 
CAR (–2, +2) 
Treat × Post -0.926* -1.316*** -1.054* -6.224*** 
 
(-1.79) (-2.87) (-1.97) (-6.36) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes No 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incorp state FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Number of observations 1,805 1,820 2,368 50 
R2 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.34 
Panel B     
  (5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
HQ 
information 
from SEC 
Control UD 
Laws 
Control 
additional 
state 
regulations 
Control 
disclosure 
quality 
 
CAR (–2, +2) 
Treat × Post -1.275*** -1.308*** -1.318*** -1.325*** 
 
(-2.75) (-2.87) (-2.89) (-2.82) 
UD laws 
 
1.162 0.827 
 
 
 
(1.26) (0.912) 
 
Control share acquisition laws 
 
 
9.671*** 
 
 
 
 
(3.05) 
 
Business combination laws 
 
 
1.097 
 
 
 
 
(0.58) 
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Fair price laws 
 
 
-4.362 
 
 
 
 
(-1.15) 
 
Directors' duties laws 
 
 
-7.075** 
 
 
 
 
(-2.34) 
 
Poison pill laws 
 
 
0.594 
 
 
 
 
(0.57) 
 
Restate 
 
  
1.522 
 
 
  
(1.49) 
Ln(Analysts) 
 
  
-0.029 
 
 
  
(-0.10) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Incorp state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,549 2,549 2,549 2,549 
R2 0.069 0.07 0.07 0.07 
Panel C     
  (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 
CAR (–1, +1) 
Treat × Post -0.713** -0.705* -0.909** -0.482 
 
(-2.07) (-1.90) (-2.65) (-1.09) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes No 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No 
Year and Industry FE No No No Yes 
Incorp state FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of observations 2,549 2,549 2,186 2,186 
R2 0.049 0.070 0.074 0.153 
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Appendix 1 
Variable definitions 
 
Variable Definition and data source 
Measures of shareholder litigation 
Treat An indicator variable, equal to one if the firm is headquartered in one of the 
nine states under the Ninth Circuit Court’s jurisdiction (Alaska, Arizona, 
California, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, Oregon, and Washington). 
Source: SEC Filings and Compustat 
Post An indicator variable, equal to one if the deal announcement date is after 
1999. Source: SDC 
Measure of acquisition performance  
CAR (–2, +2) 
 
 
Acquirer's five-day CAR, calculated using the market model. The market 
model parameters are estimated for the period (–210, –11), with the CRSP 
value-weighted return as the market index. Source: CRSP 
Bidder CEO characteristics 
CEO age >= 60 An indicator variable equal to one if the CEO is 60 or older, and zero 
otherwise. Source: Execucomp 
CEO gender 
 
An indicator variable, equal to one if the CEO is male, and zero otherwise. 
Source: Execucomp 
 
CEO delta 
 
Dollar increase in acquirer CEO's portfolio wealth for a percentage increase in 
the underlying stock price. Source: Execucomp 
 
CEO duality 
 
An indicator variable, equal to one if the CEO is also the chairperson of the 
board of directors, and zero otherwise. Source: Execucomp 
 
CEO overconfidence 
 
A measure of how in-the-money the CEO's vested stock options are. This is 
calculated by dividing the value of unexercised exercisable options 
(OPT_UNEX_EXER_EST_VAL) by the number of options 
(OPT_UNEX_EXER_NUM), all scaled by the stock price at the end of the fiscal 
year (PRCC). Source: Execucomp and Compustat 
 
CEO ownership Percentage of shares held by the CEO. Source: Execucomp 
Bidder firm characteristics 
Ln(Assets) Natural logarithm of total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
Leverage Book value of debt (DLTT + DLC) divided by book value of total assets (AT). 
Source: Compustat 
 
Tobin’s Q Market value of assets over book value of assets ((AT – CEQ + CSHO × PRCC) ÷ 
AT). Source: Compustat 
 
Free cash flow Operating income before depreciation (OIBDP) minus interest expense (XINT) 
minus income taxes (TXT) minus capital expenditures (CAPX), all divided by 
total assets (AT). Source: Compustat 
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Sales growth 
 
Net sales (SALE) minus lagged net sales, all divided by lagged net sales. 
Source: Compustat 
 
Firm governance 
 
Governance quality index, consisting of CEO duality, board independence, 
and the E-index. We split each of the three measures into two groups, with 
higher values of board independence, lower E-index values, and lack of CEO 
duality indicating better governance, and cumulate the ranks (0–1). We then 
divide the cumulated ranks by the number of measures available for the firm-
year to obtain the governance index score. A higher value indicates better 
governance. Source: Execucomp and Riskmetrics 
 
Institutional ownership 
 
Percentage of common shares owned by institutional investors. Source: 
Thomson Reuters 13f Filings 
 
Abnormal accruals Abnormal accruals are calculated using the modified Jones model. Source: 
Compustat 
Deal characteristics 
Stock price runup 
 
Bidder's buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) during the period (–210, –
11). The market index is the CRSP value-weighted return. Source: CRSP 
 
Relative deal size (or 
RelSize) 
 
Deal value over bidder's market value of equity at the 11th day prior to deal 
announcement. Source: SDC and CRSP 
 
High-tech 
 
An indicator variable, equal to one if the bidder and target are both from 
high-tech industries, as defined by Loughran and Ritter (2004), and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Cross-border An indicator variable, equal to one if the target nation is not the same as the 
acquirer nation, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC 
 
Cross-industry 
 
 
An indicator variable, equal to one if the bidder and target do not share a 
Fama–French industry, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC 
All-cash deal An indicator variable, equal to one for purely cash-financed deals, and zero 
otherwise. Source: SDC 
 
Stock80% An indicator variable, equal to one if 80% of the acquisition is funded by 
stock, and zero otherwise. Source: SDC 
 
 
Private target 
 
 
An indicator variable, equal to one for private targets, and zero otherwise. 
Source: SDC 
 
NegM&A 
 
 
M&A Wave 
An indicator variable, equal to one if the firm experiences value-decreasing 
M&A announcement returns, and zero otherwise. 
 
Annual number of acquisitions in a given industry. 
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Treated target 
 
An indicator variable, equal to one if the target firm is in a Ninth Circuit state, 
and zero otherwise. Source: SDC 
Information quality 
Restate An indicator variable, equal to one if the firm restates its financial statements 
in the given fiscal year, and zero otherwise. Source: GAO Financial 
Restatement Database 
Ln(Analysts) Natural logarithm of one plus the number of analysts issuing the firm’s 
earnings forecast. Source: I/B/E/S 
Fore_Error Management’s EPS forecast minus actual EPS, divided by lagged calendar-end 
stock price. Source I/B/E/S 
Abs(Fore_Error) Absolute value of Fore_Error 
Ln(1+ duration) Natural logarithm of one plus the number of days from the announcement 
date of management’s earnings forecast to the announcement date of the 
M&A deal. Source: I/B/E/S and SDC 
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Appendix 2 
First stage of Heckman model: Sample selection correction  
 
This table presents the results from the probit regression used in the first stage of the Heckman model, 
which corrects for sample selection bias. The t-statistics are calculated from robust standard errors 
clustered by acquirer headquarter state, and are displayed in parentheses. Statistical significance at the 
1% level is indicated by ***. All variables are defined in Appendix 1. 
  (1) 
  Pr(Acquisition = 1) 
CEO age >= 60 -0.003 
 
(-0.835) 
CEO gender 0.088 
 
(-0.444) 
CEO delta -0.006 
 
(-1.363) 
CEO overconfidence 0.700*** 
 
(8.034) 
Ln(Assets) 0.060*** 
 
(3.613) 
Leverage -0.077 
 
(-0.621) 
Tobin’s Q 0.018 
 
(1.281) 
Free cash flow 0.940*** 
 
(4.040) 
Sales growth 0.276*** 
 
(5.304) 
Firm governance 0.063 
 
(0.996) 
Constant -1.650*** 
 
(-3.629) 
Year FE Yes 
Industry FE Yes 
Number of observations 7,250 
Pseudo R2 0.08 
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